Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam

Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam

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  • Author:Fredrik Logevall
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Summary

WINNER OF THE PULITZER PRIZE

Written with the style of a great novelist and the intrigue of a Cold War thriller, Embers of War is a landmark work that will forever change your understanding of how and why America went to war in Vietnam。 Tapping newly accessible diplomatic archives in several nations, Fredrik Logevall traces the path that led two Western nations to tragically lose their way in the jungles of Southeast Asia。 He brings to life the bloodiest battles of France’s final years in Indochina—and shows how, from an early point, a succession of American leaders made disastrous policy choices that put America on its own collision course with history。

An epic story of wasted opportunities and deadly miscalculations, Embers of War delves deep into the historical record to provide hard answers to the unanswered questions surrounding the demise of one Western power in Vietnam and the arrival of another。 Eye-opening and compulsively readable, Embers of War is a gripping, heralded work that illuminates the hidden history of the French and American experiences in Vietnam。

ONE OF THE MOST ACCLAIMED WORKS OF HISTORY IN RECENT YEARS

Winner of the Francis Parkman Prize from the Society of American Historians • Winner of the American Library in Paris Book Award • Winner of the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Book Award • Finalist for the Cundill Prize in Historical Literature
 
NAMED ONE OF THE BEST BOOKS OF THE YEAR BY
The Washington Post • The Christian Science Monitor • The Globe and Mail
 
“A balanced, deeply researched history of how, as French colonial rule faltered, a succession of American leaders moved step by step down a road toward full-blown war。”—Pulitzer Prize citation
 
“This extraordinary work of modern history combines powerful narrative thrust, deep scholarly authority, and quiet interpretive confidence。”—Francis Parkman Prize citation
 
“A monumental history 。 。 。 a widely researched and eloquently written account of how the U。S。 came to be involved in Vietnam 。 。 。 certainly the most comprehensive review of this period to date。”The Wall Street Journal
 
“Superb 。 。 。 a product of formidable international research。”The Washington Post
 
“Lucid and vivid 。 。 。 [a] definitive history。”San Francisco Chronicle
 
“An essential work for those seeking to understand the worst foreign-policy adventure in American history 。 。 。 Even though readers know how the story ends—as with The Iliad—they will be as riveted by the tale as if they were hearing it for the first time。”The Christian Science Monitor
 
“A remarkable new history 。 。 。 Logevall skillfully explains everything that led up to Vietnam’s fatal partition in 1954 [and] peppers the grand sweep of his book with vignettes of remarkable characters, wise and foolish。”The Economist
 
“Fascinating, beautifully written 。 。 。 Logevall’s account provides much new detail and important new insights。 。 。 。 It is impossible to read the book without being struck by contemporary parallels。”Foreign Policy
 
“[A] brilliant history of how the French colonial war to hang on to its colonies in Indochina became what the Vietnamese now call ‘the American war。’” —Esquire
 
“An excellent, valuable book。” —The Dallas Morning News

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Reviews

Eric Hollen

An examination of France's role in the First Indochina War and the debacles that eventually lead up to America's involvement in the Second Indochina War (The Vietnam War)。 Pretty much, France, after getting whipped by the Nazis, attempts to reclaim its colonies and "territories" in Vietnam after World War II。 Part of this is because they want the resources, the mercenary soldiers to fight for France in case of another war, as well as some "reclaiming our empire" energy after being whipped by the An examination of France's role in the First Indochina War and the debacles that eventually lead up to America's involvement in the Second Indochina War (The Vietnam War)。 Pretty much, France, after getting whipped by the Nazis, attempts to reclaim its colonies and "territories" in Vietnam after World War II。 Part of this is because they want the resources, the mercenary soldiers to fight for France in case of another war, as well as some "reclaiming our empire" energy after being whipped by the Nazis in such a short amount of time。 FDR, who was very anti-colonial, pressured both Britain and France to give up any colonial or empire ambitions after World War II, but unfortunately, he died。 It was interesting to note that, at the time of his death, Asian goodwill towards the US was at a high point because of this as well as the US relinquishing control over the Philippines。 But unfortunately France gets involved, and a war between Ho Chi Minh and Giap's communists (who were, in some readings, nationalists who just wanted independence from colonial France) started against colonial France。 France is able to successfully get US aid and involvement by neutralizing any of the anti-colonial residues of the FDR supporters and camp by convincing the US that Vietnam is an anti-communist endeavor。 Truman steps up his aid, but the Vietminh force the French to a stalemate in the infamous battle of Dien Bien Phu。 While the Soviet Union and Britain spearhead the Geneva Convention in order to find some settlement to the dispute, the U。S。, high and haughty in its fight against communism, refuses to accept the terms of the convention, namely a national election that will divide the newly partitioned North and South Vietnam, knowing that any election would swing in Ho Chi Minh's favor。 The French leave, and the US begins to step up its involvement, backing up the Diem regime, who, in attempting to establish South Vietnam, brutally cracks down on dissidents, instituting an authoritarian US-backed regime until his eventual ouster and assassination by disgruntled generals (with U。S。 blessings)。 But Diem's brutality, and the US backing the wrong horse, ultimately leads to a politically charged atmosphere in which the Vietminh are able to take advantage of southern discontent, thus paving the grounds for the second Indochina War as well as US involvement。 Interesting to note are how the mechanics of US democracy, noticeably the pissing contest over being "soft on communism" and the way the Vietnam "problem" was handed from one President to another, none of whom wanted to fully examine it because they didn't want to cause a "ruckus," led to the US involvement in Vietnam。 Also noticeable is the way that the US didn't learn from the French experience, and how they actively sabotaged chances for Vietnam's peace and reconciliation because they were bull-headed in fighting a Communist "monolith" (the domino theory)。 The book doesn't really get too involved with presidents after Eisenhower, affording small glimpses of FDR and Johnson in the book's epilogue。 Also, while the book was pretty narratively gripping, the section on the mediations and negotiations during the Geneva convention made for some pretty dry reading。 Overall though, felt like this was a good introduction, personally, to the First Indochina War。 。。。more

Elizabeth

1

Boston64329

This is an amazing book。 A great history of Vietnam from 1919 to 1959 with a little of 1961 with JFK。 A great style of writing that made it read like a novel。 Didn't take any sides and exposed the failures of the French and presidents from Truman forward。 Who would have guessed the the Soviets and the Communist Chinese would be the leaders in the bifurcation of Vietnam and strongly suggesting to Ho not to continue the fight into the south。 I was always under the impression that the North held up This is an amazing book。 A great history of Vietnam from 1919 to 1959 with a little of 1961 with JFK。 A great style of writing that made it read like a novel。 Didn't take any sides and exposed the failures of the French and presidents from Truman forward。 Who would have guessed the the Soviets and the Communist Chinese would be the leaders in the bifurcation of Vietnam and strongly suggesting to Ho not to continue the fight into the south。 I was always under the impression that the North held up the vote because they were afraid to lose the unification election。 That was something I remember hearing as a young man。 Quite the opposite was true。 There were atrocities in both the North and the South after the respective regions were set up but we only heard of those happening in the North。 I now have additions for my reading list。 。。。more

Dave

Fascinating read。

Nick Crisanti

Fascinating and well-told, no doubt earning its Pulitzer Prize。 Fredrik Logevall entertains and educates as he takes us through Ho Chi Minh's attempt to gain independence for Vietnam from the French by political and military means and the backing of the vast might and influence of the United States。 After WWII came to a close and with America's promise to grant independence to the Philippines Ho Chi Minh saw an opportunity for France to do the same with Vietnam。 He lobbied and cajoled, but Franc Fascinating and well-told, no doubt earning its Pulitzer Prize。 Fredrik Logevall entertains and educates as he takes us through Ho Chi Minh's attempt to gain independence for Vietnam from the French by political and military means and the backing of the vast might and influence of the United States。 After WWII came to a close and with America's promise to grant independence to the Philippines Ho Chi Minh saw an opportunity for France to do the same with Vietnam。 He lobbied and cajoled, but France was not about to give up its possessions and start to disassemble their empire after the Allies had won the war。 Of course this inevitably led to armed conflict, in which France was not prepared nor capable of winning in the jungles of Southeast Asia against a Vietnamese populace that didn't want them and against guerilla tactics they had insufficient means to counteract。 Once the battle of Dien Bien Phu was won by the Viet Minh, the prospects of a promising settlement at the Geneva Conference in 1954 was bright for Ho Chi Minh and his allies, and ultimately led to a partition of Vietnam with national elections due two years hence to unite the country。 (Those elections never took place, to the delight of those in power in the south。) Throughout all of this, the United States wanted the Communists out of Indochina, believing the spread of communism in the area would be a risk to national security, and so provided first France with money, materiel, and advisors and then the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam once France extricated themselves entirely。 And now the United States alone were left to protect those in the south from the menace of the north, as they said。 And obviously there was no choice but to continue our mission after we put so much importance on expelling communism in Southeast Asia lest all the dominoes should fall, which would lead to our own prolonged, ill-conceived and unnecessary war in Vietnam。 。。。more

Thomas Traube

The best book for anyone who truly wants to understand the history of Vietnam and how America ended up at war there。

Bill Jordan

Excruciatingly detailed history of the French experience in Vietnam。 If we had paid attention and had understood the power of nationalism (as opposed to the illusory power of international Communism), we might have sided with the freedom fighters against the colonialists。 But we didn't understand core human impulses, and we were captured by the rabid McCarthyite right。 It's clear from this book that Eisenhower gets the blame for the commitments that set our fatal course。 Excruciatingly detailed history of the French experience in Vietnam。 If we had paid attention and had understood the power of nationalism (as opposed to the illusory power of international Communism), we might have sided with the freedom fighters against the colonialists。 But we didn't understand core human impulses, and we were captured by the rabid McCarthyite right。 It's clear from this book that Eisenhower gets the blame for the commitments that set our fatal course。 。。。more

Fridtjof Karlstad

If you ever want to understand the Vietnam War and how the US got entangled in to the South-East Asia complex, this is the book。 It is simply superb。

Peter A

Must be the definitive history of Vietnam, the nation, the war and the persons involved。 The history of Ho Chi Minh and his struggle over 60 years to free Vietnam is reported in detail。 De Gaulle comes out very badly (again) and the disaster decision by a number of US Presidents to maintain a colonial attitude is made very clear。 One does feel sadness about the idiocy and futility of it all, especially in view of what is happening in Ukraine。 Mr Putin would do well to read this book。

Langdon Ogburn

Indisputably an excellent history of French imperialism and US buildup to the Vietnam war。 I wouldn’t recommend reading this book if you are looking for a thrilling read, but if this part of history interests you, this is the book to read。

G

Pretty good book - 3。8 rounded up。 This book was much more focused on the people and politics than it was on events on the ground。 Which is fine because the latter has been covered in dozens and dozens of books。 The strength of this one is not only a real fair and thorough treatment of Ho Chi Minh, but also some great insights into a cast of supporting characters, both famous and obscure。 Some of the politics got sort of boring and repetitive (in my opinion) and I did skim a bit after the fall o Pretty good book - 3。8 rounded up。 This book was much more focused on the people and politics than it was on events on the ground。 Which is fine because the latter has been covered in dozens and dozens of books。 The strength of this one is not only a real fair and thorough treatment of Ho Chi Minh, but also some great insights into a cast of supporting characters, both famous and obscure。 Some of the politics got sort of boring and repetitive (in my opinion) and I did skim a bit after the fall of Dien Bien Phu。 But all in all a pretty good read。 😊 。。。more

Bobby D

“Embers of War” won the 2013 Pulitzer Prize in History。 It is a masterpiece of non-fiction telling both the military and diplomatic history of the First Indochina War。 The war was fought by France (with significant United States aid from the start) to regain its Colonial rule over Vietnam。 The book is an immensely impressive examination of the origins of what Americans call “The Vietnam War” and what the Vietnamese call “The American War”。 Most impressive are the stories of the people the reader “Embers of War” won the 2013 Pulitzer Prize in History。 It is a masterpiece of non-fiction telling both the military and diplomatic history of the First Indochina War。 The war was fought by France (with significant United States aid from the start) to regain its Colonial rule over Vietnam。 The book is an immensely impressive examination of the origins of what Americans call “The Vietnam War” and what the Vietnamese call “The American War”。 Most impressive are the stories of the people the reader meets along the way who by choice, accident, unintended consequences, ignorance, paranoia, or simply victims of history's bad timing。 They all seemed joined on an escalator that never seems to stop so they can look back upon History repeating itself with heartbreaking results。 My notes on the chronology covered in the book: In 1919 Ho Chi Min tried to meet with President Wilson to petition for Vietnamese independence。 In 1930 he presided over the creation of the Vietnamese Communist Party while in Hong Kong。 In WWII France’s Indochina Empire was overrun by the Japanese。 During this time Ho Chi Min fought on the side of the Americans with the hope that President Roosevelt would support Vietnamese independence at the end of the war。 When Roosevelt died President Truman paid little attention to the issue of Vietnamese independence as he was focused on Europe and needed France in the coalition。 He also had to focus on China and Korea。 President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (who is certainly the villain of this period) took a hard line supporting only a military solution。 If the French couldn’t win the US could。 JFK early on saw the war as unwinnable because it was a war for independence (hearts and mines needed winning) and the French did not know how to fight against guerrilla warfare。 (JFK would later change his position when running for President。)The French seeing that they were not going to win (having lost a major battle at Dien Bien Phu in 1954) wanted to negotiate a peace agreement similar to the diplomatic one the United States had done in Korea。 Eisenhower was opposed to this (surprisingly, he was quite hawkish and hypocritical)。 He and Dulles wanted Congress to support unilateral intervention but Congress insisted the US needed a multi-national coalition before they would approve。 The British (Churchhill and Anthony Eaden… the closest thing to a diplomatic hero of the period) were opposed to the US military plan。 The United States could not build support for unilateral intervention。 At Geneva, the French (the US refused to participate) accepted partitioning Vietnam (north and south) with free elections to be held to unify the country in two years (which the US opposed because Eisenhower felt Ho Chi Min would win saying, “possibly 80% of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai。”)The French looked for a new South Vietnamese leader and with the US-supported Ngo Diem。 He became a corrupt autocrat who failed to win the support of the people。 Yet Eisenhower greeted him on a victory tour of the United States billing him as a victor for democracy and as a hard-line anti-communist。 There was no turning back now as Diem had been given the keys to the kingdom。 In the meantime, Ho Chi Min’s communist party was self-immolating as it harshly implemented land confiscation reforms that created unrest and undermined Ho’s nationalistic democratic credentials。 On July 8, 1959, eight American military advisors were watching a movie when two Viet Cong guerrillas positioned a French-made submachine gun in a rear window。 When the room's lights were turned back on two of the Americans, Ovnand and Buis were killed in the ambush。 They were the first to be killed in the Second Indochina War。 They are the first two names on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial below 1959。 The die was cast and lasted another 16 years。David Halberstam said, “The problem was trying to cover something every day as news when in fact the real key was that it was all derivative of the French Indochina war, which is history。 So you really should have had a third paragraph in each story which should have said… All of this is shit and none of the means anything because we are in the same footsteps as the French and we are prisoners of their experience。” America’s intervention… occurred “in the embers of another colonial war。”Ho Chi Min said back in 1946 at the start of the war with France。 “It will be a war between an elephant and a tiger。 If the tiger ever stands still the Elephant will crush him with his mighty tusks。 But the tiger does not standstill。 He lurks in the jungle by day and emerges only at night。 He will leap upon the back of the elephant, tearing huge chunks from his hide, and then he will leap back into the dark jungle。 And slowly the elephant will bleed to death。” 。。。more

Stefania Dzhanamova

The only thing worse than a book that disappoints is a long book whose last 100-200 pages disappoint。I was impressed by EMBERS OF WAR at first。 It is difficult for me to even imagine how much effort had gone into this sweeping tale of the First Indochina War, the tumultuous Geneva conference, and the subsequent involvement of the Eisenhower administration in South Vietnam。 Fredrik Logevall has somehow managed to combine compelling, graceful storytelling with incredibly detailed chronicling of ev The only thing worse than a book that disappoints is a long book whose last 100-200 pages disappoint。I was impressed by EMBERS OF WAR at first。 It is difficult for me to even imagine how much effort had gone into this sweeping tale of the First Indochina War, the tumultuous Geneva conference, and the subsequent involvement of the Eisenhower administration in South Vietnam。 Fredrik Logevall has somehow managed to combine compelling, graceful storytelling with incredibly detailed chronicling of events and insightful analysis。 And there are maps and photos included! I was so happy to read a book that proved my point of view on the Franco-Vietnamese conflict that I even let a major problem I had with Logevall's work slide。 Now that I have finished the book and – alas – changed my opinion of it, I cannot ignore it anymore。Throughout his narrative, Frederik Logevall mentions many curious details that I have not encountered in other works。 This could be commendable if the author supported his claims with evidence。 Instead, on many occasions, such details are included as a matter of fact, without any sources to prove them。 For instance, I was very surprised to find out that General Giap used to be a history teacher。 I had not seen this in any of the other books on Dien Bien Phu I have read, so I wanted to know Logevall's source。 As it turned out after I checked the notes, he had not provided any proof at all。 He credits David G。 Marr's book Vietnam 1945, which I have read, in the same paragraph, but Giap's being a history teacher is not mentioned in it – I double-checked。 Historical facts are not axioms。 They are theorems。 Unless proven, they do not hold any value, and as I found out in seventh grade, "Because it is obvious to me that it is so" is not sound proof。If this had been my only concern, I would have given EMBERS OF WAR four stars。 But that was not the case。 It is funny how once the discussion turns to Ngo Dinh Diem and his regime, everything immediately goes south。 I really hoped that Frederik Logevall's reasoning would be well-argumented, but instead, his treatment of Diem is unfoundedly hostile。 While that his claims are shallow is less obvious than in most other works, and it took me more time to notice, this is so only because he uses truths to prove wrongs。His thesis is – not surprising – that Ngo Dinh Diem was a ruthless dictator, a kind of modernized but largely ignorant mandarin who could not connect with the people of Vietnam。 First of all, that was not true。 Diem's background had made him well aware of the complexities of Vietnam and its civil war。 After college graduation in 1921, he became a district chief in charge of 225 villages。 Despite his youth and inexperience, he proved himself a gifted leader。 He successfully combatted guerrilla insurgency in southern villages by infiltrating the Communist ranks, arresting Viet Minh's agents, and re-educating them。 According to Diem biographer Geoffrey Shaw, the young colonial official thoroughly studied Marxism and Communism, paying attention to the nuances of Ho Chi Minh's Vietnamese Communism, thus becoming one of the first Vietnamese officials fully to discern the extent to which the Communists had gained support in the country。” The 1950s North Vietnamese land reform, which was supposed to divide the land of the rich among the poor, was an overwhelming failure。 Meanwhile, Diem's achievements in rebuilding the southern half of the country were winning over the ordinary Vietnamese。 CIA Saigon Station Chief William Colby called Diem's reforms the total social and economic regeneration of South Vietnam。” He was attuned to the needs of the ordinary Vietnamese, perceptive, and wise。 Second of all, probably due to lack of arguments in favor of the opposite, Logevall does not even try to prove it。 Instead, he simply switches to arguing for something else – something that is correct。 He argues that American policy-makers made many mistakes in South Vietnam, so the state-building there never worked, and proceeds to enumerate those mistakes。He points out, correctly, that the US military advisers in Vietnam misjudged the Viet Minh completely and focused on preparing for a large-scale invasion from the north instead of eradicating the guerrillas from the countryside。 He observes that the American government made constant attempts to control all decisions Diem made and thus undermined his legitimacy by fostering the Communist "America-Diem" propaganda。 He mentions that the Vietnam lobby and the news media outdid themselves in portraying South Vietnam's Prime Minister as a miracle man who could do no wrong, which again contributed to the eventual disappointment。 And it is also undeniably true that the Americans in Vietnam acted like the next colonial power to impose itself on the long-suffering Vietnamese。 Logevall connects this with his initial thesis so skillfully that a more inexperienced reader will surely finish the book with the understanding that all of the aforementioned was Diem's fault。 But if we look closely at the accusations the author levels, none of the aforementioned is Diem's fault。 It is the fault of American policy-makers and military men who went to Vietnam abysmally ignorant of the situation there。 Diem, on the other hand, did everything he could to prevent the recipes for disasters his superpower ally was forcing on him。 As a non-Communist nationalist prioritizing his country's interests, he understood that not all recommendations Saigon received from its American advisers were rational and applicable to Vietnam。What's more, Frederik Logevall's shallow reasoning disappointed me further。 He criticizes Ngo Dinh Diem for his efforts to prevent the "free", "democratic" elections that should have taken place in 1956 in Vietnam to determine who would rule afterwards – Ho Chi Minh or Ngo Dinh Diem。 Logevall sneers at Diem because the Prime Minister thought elections could not take place unless North Vietnam grants fundamental freedoms and democratic institutions to the people。 "Since — according to the time-honored American line — no one could ever vote for a Communist regime of his own free will (Communism being wholly divorced from the mainstream of normal human beliefs), these conditions must not yet exist in Vietnam," writes the author sarcastically。 Well, I cannot help but wonder whether Frederik Logevall has ever heard of the dreaded manifestation of Communism– GULAG – or, better yet, tried to live in Stalin's Soviet Union。 I doubt that someone who has would classify Communism among "normal human beliefs。" Ngo Dinh Diem, on the other hand, had had the opportunity to observe first-hand the rise of the Viet Minh, the brutal persecution of Catholics by Hanoi, and the atrocities committed by Communist guerrillas in South Vietnamese villages。 He fully understood what would happen to his country if Ho Chi Minh won the election – and the possibility that he would win it was very real。 As Graham Greene's character points out in his renowned novel The Quiet American, after working in the rice fields the whole day, the Vietnamese peasant did not think about Marxism-Leninism and democracy in his hut。 Instead, he pondered whether he would have enough food for his family; whether the harvest would be good; whether he would manage to pay the outrageous taxes。 The Vietnamese peasant was not going to fight for ideology, but he was going to fight for whoever offers him a better deal。 At the time, the Communists were offering a tempting deal。 Maybe it was not an achievable one; maybe they were lying。 But the rural population believed them because it was not aware of the evil essence of a Communist state。 Ngo Dinh Diem understood this very well, so he sought to save the people from themselves。 That is why he obstructed the elections, not because he was a savage, cunning despot。 What a disappointment really。 I expected so much from EMBERS OF WAR。 It would have been such a great read for me if not for the last few chapters devoted to discrediting Ngo Dinh Diem。 I wish I could recommend this book, but it may seriously mislead those readers who have not studied the Diem regime in-depth。 The chapters focusing on the post-WWII Franco-Vietnamese, Franco-British, and Franco-American relations, the battle of Dien Bien Phu, and Operation Vulture are detailed, compelling, and insightful, though, as are those analyzing the Eisenhower administration's negligence toward Vietnam and the problems it led to, so anyone interested should take a look at them。 。。。more

Andrew

Reviewing France's impact on Vietnam, this book goes through everything in excruciating detail。 I wish it was easier to read, though it was nevertheless enjoyable。 Reviewing France's impact on Vietnam, this book goes through everything in excruciating detail。 I wish it was easier to read, though it was nevertheless enjoyable。 。。。more

David Harris

Very highly recommended。 Details the story of Ho Chi Minh and other determined Vietnamese PATRIOTS relentlessly pursuing independence for the people of Vietnam。 Quickly learning that the Treaty of Versailles and Wilson’s 14 points, League of Nations scribbling was simply a political and academic distraction the Vietnamese continued to appeal to a notion of justice and good will from the Allied powers。 Continuously rebuked they decided to take matters into their own hands。 And they won。 Unfortuna Very highly recommended。 Details the story of Ho Chi Minh and other determined Vietnamese PATRIOTS relentlessly pursuing independence for the people of Vietnam。 Quickly learning that the Treaty of Versailles and Wilson’s 14 points, League of Nations scribbling was simply a political and academic distraction the Vietnamese continued to appeal to a notion of justice and good will from the Allied powers。 Continuously rebuked they decided to take matters into their own hands。 And they won。 Unfortunately the tragic and useless destruction that followed cannot be undone。 Read this and you will be a more thoughtful and intelligent person。 You may be more convinced than ever that character and insight rather than slogans and speeches are what we need in leaders。 The Vietnamese had the former。 。。。more

Arthur Rohloff

Great analysis of pre-US involvement in Vietnam that also explores the issues we would face after the French withdrawal。

Brian

Fills in my knowledge gap between the two wars; sweeping and comprehensive, though Ho Chi Minh remains a bit of an enigma, despite his ubiquitous presence。

Erik Riker-Coleman

I've taught a Vietnam War course for many years and I learned some things, so yeah, pretty good。 The dust jacket's insistence that it reads like a fictional thriller is maybe a little bit of an overstatement, but not by too much--it really is both illuminating and engaging。 I've taught a Vietnam War course for many years and I learned some things, so yeah, pretty good。 The dust jacket's insistence that it reads like a fictional thriller is maybe a little bit of an overstatement, but not by too much--it really is both illuminating and engaging。 。。。more

solon j lane

If only our American politicians would read, and comprehend, and learn from 。。。 HistoryAs a lifetime reader of history, and a believer in our constitutional system, this one is an arrow through my heart。 With a lesson to be learned in every chapter, passing a test on this book would be my prerequisite for any elected or appointed official in our government。 So many wasted lives in our naive, self serving, nation building adventures。 So much treasure thrown away, and respect lost。 Again and again If only our American politicians would read, and comprehend, and learn from 。。。 HistoryAs a lifetime reader of history, and a believer in our constitutional system, this one is an arrow through my heart。 With a lesson to be learned in every chapter, passing a test on this book would be my prerequisite for any elected or appointed official in our government。 So many wasted lives in our naive, self serving, nation building adventures。 So much treasure thrown away, and respect lost。 Again and again。This very readable and referenced account is, IMHO, both the counterinsurgency equivalent of 'The Guns of August', and a primer on how good intentions transform into obscene American military interventionism。 。。。more

E。

I thoroughly enjoyed reading this book。 Like many Americans, my knowledge of the Vietnam conflict was extremely limited, and what I do know of the conflict usually starts at the point when the French lost and the US started increasing its involvement in the region。 It is almost as if Vietnam happened in a vacuum and nothing else "mattered" until the US arrived on the scene。。。 in short, I had a very American-centric knowledge of the conflict。Which is why this book is a resounding five-star for me I thoroughly enjoyed reading this book。 Like many Americans, my knowledge of the Vietnam conflict was extremely limited, and what I do know of the conflict usually starts at the point when the French lost and the US started increasing its involvement in the region。 It is almost as if Vietnam happened in a vacuum and nothing else "mattered" until the US arrived on the scene。。。 in short, I had a very American-centric knowledge of the conflict。Which is why this book is a resounding five-star for me。 Embers of War, for the most part, only briefly touched on the Vietnam conflict like most Americans know it。 Instead, Logevall chose to focus his book on the French in Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh, starting around WW1 and through WW2 and the French's effort to reclaim Vietnam for her Empire。 The book was unsparingly honest about French colonialism, the irony and contradiction of fighting to give Vietnam her "independence" while still keeping her in the French empire, and the valiant efforts of the French troops in waging a seven year war that was almost doomed to fail from the start。Throughout the book Logevall did a wonderful job weaving in the US involvement in Vietnam, starting briefly with Woodrow Wilson, FDR, and then demonstrated the slippery slope Presidents Truman, Ike, JFK, and LBJ all went on that eventually led to the quagmire。 I especially appreciated the detailed account of historical figures like Churchill, Eden, Dulles, de Gaulle, and others。 The book also did justice in detailing the Sino-Soviet side as well as internal Viet Minh deliberations and decision-making。Lastly, I wanted to highlight that, content and analysis aside, Logevall did a superb job in making sure the book was not "dry" to read。 Most history books are long on details but short on flair to keep the casual readers engaged。 Not so here。 I am especially thankful of different colloquialism employed in the book。 All in all, an amazing book on early history of the Vietnam conflict, and very deserving of its Pulitzer Prize。 I cannot recommend this book enough。 。。。more

Peter Stein

Awesome read! The rare combination of outstanding research with page-turning writing。 It's surprising that this history is so undertaught (untaught, even) in the U。S。, given how clearly the foundations were laid for American involvement during the 1940s and 50s。 I would recommend this without reservation to anyone with an interest in history。 Awesome read! The rare combination of outstanding research with page-turning writing。 It's surprising that this history is so undertaught (untaught, even) in the U。S。, given how clearly the foundations were laid for American involvement during the 1940s and 50s。 I would recommend this without reservation to anyone with an interest in history。 。。。more

Jarred Goodall

Dr。 Logevall produces a well-researched, detailed, and compelling work, which helps explain the quagmire known as the war in Vietnam, when added together, lasted at least 30 years, if not longer。

Michael Kelley

A tremendous book detailing how the United States blundered into war in Vietnam。

Fadi Hage

Fantastic book on the pre-Vietnam war。 Comprehensive, objective and insightful。

Marvin Goodman

Don't read THIS review, because there are some really thorough, thoughtful, erudite ones below, that I am simultaneously incapable of, and short of time to, emulate here。 It's just difficult for me to rate a book (that I hope others will read) and not say ANYTHING about it in this little box。It's a long book, but nary a word is wasted in painting a comprehensive, understandable picture of the long prelude to direct American involvement in Indochina, a period that I had little insight into。 I rea Don't read THIS review, because there are some really thorough, thoughtful, erudite ones below, that I am simultaneously incapable of, and short of time to, emulate here。 It's just difficult for me to rate a book (that I hope others will read) and not say ANYTHING about it in this little box。It's a long book, but nary a word is wasted in painting a comprehensive, understandable picture of the long prelude to direct American involvement in Indochina, a period that I had little insight into。 I read it because I was thinking about the Afghanistan pull-out, and looking for parallels to improve my understanding, and was stunned at how many opportunities American Presidents (and others) had to deescalate the downward spiral into war, or to potentially change the dynamics of the nascent cold war。 It's easy to consider those things in hindsight, of course, and Logevall does an admirable job of laying out the situation as it faced political leaders at the time。 Really excellent work here, and very engaging。 。。。more

Dee Wilson

This is an outstanding history of the French Indochina war, 1945-54 that explains clearly how and why the US ended up in a debacle in Vietnam。 Logevall has fascinating stories regarding French, British, American, Chinese and Vietnamese political and military leaders who made policy and determined military strategy; but an even better account and analysis of the ideas, beliefs, delusions and aspirations of the various parties that led inexorably to war。 In the case of Indochina, ideas, delusions This is an outstanding history of the French Indochina war, 1945-54 that explains clearly how and why the US ended up in a debacle in Vietnam。 Logevall has fascinating stories regarding French, British, American, Chinese and Vietnamese political and military leaders who made policy and determined military strategy; but an even better account and analysis of the ideas, beliefs, delusions and aspirations of the various parties that led inexorably to war。 In the case of Indochina, ideas, delusions (e。g。 the domino effect) and aspirations ( France: to retain its empire and regain great power status following humiliating defeat by the Germans in 1940; Viet Minh: to rid Vietnam of the colonial rule of France and any other occupying power such as the US) controlled leaders who were their agents rather than vice versa。 The US comes across as so zealously anticommunist and fearful of Communism that it was unable to discern the motives of its enemies, or acknowledge that nationalism, not political ideology, was the driving force of all parties in Indochina, i。e。, France, the Viet Minh and then North Vietnam, England, China and the Soviet Union。 Logevall also makes clear that the Eisenhower Administration was willing to create a second Korea in Indochina in 1954, and that a war was avoided only because the British (under Churchill and Anthony Eden) would not sign on to an international coalition for war in Indochina。 Dulles lusted for war; it was not Eisenhower who stopped Dulles, but rather Anthony Eden who viewed Dulles as a "pompous blowhard。" 。。。more

David Baer

This is not the Vietnam book you might think, with intricate exposition of the Johnson and Nixon administration’s actions leading up to the fall of Saigon。 That is more or less what I expected, and there is literally none of that。 Instead, this magisterial, 700+ page book poured tremendous knowledge into what had previously been a gap in my understanding: how did Vietnam end up being an American war, when it was a French colony at the end of WWII?The French military hold on Indochina was badly e This is not the Vietnam book you might think, with intricate exposition of the Johnson and Nixon administration’s actions leading up to the fall of Saigon。 That is more or less what I expected, and there is literally none of that。 Instead, this magisterial, 700+ page book poured tremendous knowledge into what had previously been a gap in my understanding: how did Vietnam end up being an American war, when it was a French colony at the end of WWII?The French military hold on Indochina was badly exposed by the essentially effortless Japanese takeover during WWII。 True, the Japanese allowed face-saving cooperation schemes between them and the French colonial administration。 But in March ’45 they took the French by surprise and took over administration throughout Indochina。 Only at this time did most Vietnamese fully grasp how hollow was the French basis of power。Ho Chi Minh was well-positioned to articulate an alternative as head of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP)。 In late 1945 he and his Viet Minh officials were in serious talks with American officials, looking for some form of diplomatic recognition。 Unfortunately for him (and for the historic road not taken), FDR, who was a committed anti-colonialist, died。 Truman, his successor, did not have nearly as strong a commitment to ending colonial rule in Asia, and in any case, was more concerned about maintaining smooth relations with Britain and France while navigating other immense challenges in postwar Europe。 Accordingly, the U。S。 ignored Ho Chi Minh and his claim as the leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and instead supported the return of French power in Indochina。It is true that the Americans constantly hounded the French to commit to Vietnamese independence, but also that America never seemed to get the point that Vietnamese independence would essentially obviate French interests in the area。 America was obsessed by the “domino theory” of Communist domination, and found it easier to believe in a simplistic model of a Soviet hyper-power making pawns of different states, than to believe the world was a complicated place。Having tried and failed to win support from Britain and her commonwealth nations for joint action against the Viet Minh, the Eisenhower administration was in an impossible bind of its own making。 While unwilling (and feeling unable, lacking Congressional support) to engage in direct action against the Viet Minh, they were also unwilling (and feeling unable, fearing domestic charges of “appeasement”) to support a negotiated peace。 Hence, in the wake of the Geneva agreement that created a military (not political) partition of Vietnam along the 17th parallel, the administration ratcheted up support for the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem。The Diem government, unfortunately, lacked popular support, and therefore legitimacy, from the start, and this trend only got worse over time。 The Diem regime used indiscriminate repression tactics to hold power, and Diem relied more or less exclusively on the counsel of close family members。 He routinely brushed aside American calls for democratic reform。 The twin traits that had originally favored him to the Americans were rabid anti-Communism and anti-French。 The problems posed by his intransigent authoritarianism only emerged over time, but by then, America was boxed in, lacking any legitimate alternative。 Diem thus came to control his U。S。 benefactor through the constant (though implicit) threat of collapse。Those Buddhist monks who set themselves on fire in ’63? They were protesting religious oppression by Diem’s regime。 I forgot to mention that Diem and his ilk were Catholics。By the time Kennedy came on the scene, it was far easier in the short term to stay the course, and the same was true of Johnson after him。 By then, the French were long gone, having quit Vietnam when it became obvious that the Diem regime had America’s irrevocable favor。In 1968, Charles de Gaulle, of all people (his intransigence about preserving French control in Indochina had been hugely influential in setting up the decades-long debacle) said that the U。S。 had failed to learn from the French example, that fighting would go on for ten more years, and would completely dishonor the U。S。Altogether fascinating, if you are interested in investing 45 hours or so of your time on the many political intricacies of post-war Vietnam。 I rate it “5 stars” because I did invest the time, and it has become part of me now。 。。。more

Ryan

The prequel to Vietnam。 Most of us, me included, never cared much how it got here, we just wanted to know and read about the big US engagements and how dramatic the tragedy of it all was that the US could lose a war such as this。 But what about the tragedy of actually going down that road to begin with。 This is a 700 page build up to the Vietnam War。 The entire book almost takes place in the early 1950s alone。 Just saying - this is an entirely different book on Vietnam then most are used to。 I s The prequel to Vietnam。 Most of us, me included, never cared much how it got here, we just wanted to know and read about the big US engagements and how dramatic the tragedy of it all was that the US could lose a war such as this。 But what about the tragedy of actually going down that road to begin with。 This is a 700 page build up to the Vietnam War。 The entire book almost takes place in the early 1950s alone。 Just saying - this is an entirely different book on Vietnam then most are used to。 I say don’t let that discourage you from taking the time to read this great piece of history。 There are so many layers to take away from here aside from the US getting sucked into a misguided war。 It’s the sad waning of the French empire (which let’s face it died in WW2), the end of colonialism(nothing wrong there), the Red scare of the 50s (arguably how the US bamboozled itself into the war), and the simple dream of Ho Chi Minh and his quest for independence (not totally innocent)。 It deserves all the awards it’s received, it’s very well written, immensely readable, and unbelievably thorough。 You will learn more then you already know and it may change your opinion on quite a few deep rooted convictions you may have。 That’s the importance of an origin story, it’s always important to have context。 。。。more

Peter Håkansson

Marvelous book about France's folly in Vietnam。 Marvelous book about France's folly in Vietnam。 。。。more

Megan

4。5